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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
" ' • ' ' ' I : ' " 
O L A F T H E O D O R E S T E V E N S E N , 
JR. , and BARBARA A N N 
STEVENSEN," : \ I ' i •',.: 
Plaintiffs-Respondents,\ 
v. I Case No. 
W O R L D O F F I T N E S S , INC., [ 1 3 9 4 3 
' formerly known as V E N U S H E A L T H I 
CLUB, INC., a corporation, and I 
D. L E O N A R D RICE, an individual, 
Defendants-Appellants. \ 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This is an action for breach of written warranty in 
a lease. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The case was tried to the Court and its Memoran-
dum Decision said that lessor's return of rent on park-
ing that was lost required lessee to claim breach of 
warranty upon its receipt. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A new trial on defendants' fourth cause of action. 
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S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Olaf Theodore Stevensen and Barbara Ann Stev-
ensen, plaintiffs-respondents, herein called "The Stev-
ensens", leased a spa business and premises to World 
of Fitness, Inc., herein called "World," and D. Leon-
ard Rice, herein called Rice, guaranteed it. The lease 
was for five years at $10,000 a month, with $130,000 
rent prepayment. Less than 60 days after signing and 
payment of the $130,000 a large part of parking was 
lost. 
The lease, on page 3, read: "Lessor's Obligations,— 
Lessor shall also pay when due all mortgage and park-
ing lease payments during the initial term or renewal 
period of this Agreement. Lessor warrants and repre-
sents he shall exert every reasonable effort to retain 
the leases for parking adjacent to the club including 
exercising all options to renew, and that he knows of 
no pending termination of land lease that would not be 
renewable. A copy of all such leases is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B" . If lessor loses any of the parking areas, 
the amount of monthly rent paid by Lessee shall be 
reduced: by the monthly rent which Lessor has paid for 
such area." (Italics supplied) 
The Stevensens brought an action on the lease and 
World and Rice counterclaimed (inter alia) for breach 
of written warranty (that the Stevensen's did not know 
any parking would be lost). The trial court's Memor-
andum Decision, on page 2, said: 
"2. As to defendants' counterclaim the Court 
finds and concludes that the counterclaim should 
2 
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be dismissed, and in this respect the Court makes 
the following findings: (a) That if there was a 
breach of warranty on the parking the defend-
ants waived any claim therefore by receiving 
checks from the plaintiffs covering the rent lost 
as a result of the reduced parking without mak-
ing any claim." 
The question presented is: May a Lessor who 
agrees to pay parking rent, and agrees if any parking 
is lost to return to Lessee what he would have paid as 
parking rent, make any parking rent return an exclusive 
remedy for breach of written warranty that the Lessor 
does not know of any parking that will be lost? 
P O I N T I 
A LESSOR'S D U T Y TO R E T U R N PARK-
I N G R E N T I S N O T A R E M E D Y F O R B R E A C H 
O F W A R R A N T Y T H A T L E S S O R D I D NOT 
K N O W A N Y P A R K I N G W O U L D B E LOST. 
The intent was that if parking was lost Lessor 
should return to Lessee rent he would have paid on the 
parking. 
P O I N T I I 
TO L E T A L E S S O R U S E A D U T Y TO R E -
T U R N R E N T H E W A S TO P A Y ON PARK-
I N G AS A N E X C L U S I V E R E M E D Y F O R 
B R E A C H O F W R I T T E N W A R R A N T Y 
W O U L D M A K E T H E W R I T T E N WAR-
R A N T Y M E A N I N G L E S S . 
If the Lessor knew parking would be lost when he 
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signed the lease and could write in return of rent on 
that parking was the exclusive remedy the written war-
ranty would be meaningless. 
P O I N T I I I 
L E S S O R S ' COVENANT TO R E T U R N 
P A R K I N G R E N T I F P A R K I N G W A S LOST 
($200 A M O N T H W H E R E L E S S E E S R E N T 
W A S $10,000 A M O N T H ) , I F A R E M E D Y , 
F A I L E D O F I T S E S S E N T I A L P U R P O S E . 
The court considered the same problem in Lamb 
v. Bangart, (July 29, 1974, No. 13064). The facts in 
the two cases are close enough that the fairness of the 
court's decision may be some guide in this case. These 
points seem to be very close: 
1. Each cause of action was based upon the breach 
of a written warranty in an integrated written contract; 
2. Each complaint alleged fraud, and at the trial 
evidence of fraud was offered; 
3. Defendant's claim in the Lamb case that the 
parties contemplated the death of the bull is like the 
plantiff's claim in this case that the parties contem-
plated the loss of parking (thus supposedly the alleged 
remedy was cut to fit the wrong) is answered the same 
in each case: not the death of the bull nor the loss of 
the parking is the cause of action: it is the breach of 
a written warranty. 
4 
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POINT IV 
CORRECT PARAGRAPH CONSTRUC-
TION WOULD PLACE LESSOR'S DUTY TO 
RETURN RENT TO LESSEE I F PARKING 
WAS LOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER H I S 
DUTY TO PAY RENT IN T H E PARAGRAPH 
AND NOT AFTER HIS WRITTEN WAR-
RANTY. 
The court's feeling in the Lamb case (page 6 of 
the green sheets) may apply here, for there the court 
said: 
"In the instant action, in addition to there be-
ing no provision that paragraph four provided 
the exclusive remedy, a contract clause limiting 
liability will not be applied in a fraud action. 
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity 
which will protect a person against his own fraud 
on the ground of public policy. A contract lim-
itation on damages or remedies is valid only in 
the absence of allegations of proof of fraud." 
POINT V 
T H E LAW DOES NOT PERMIT A COV-
ENANT OF IMMUNITY W H I C H WILL PRO-
TECT A PERSON AGAINST HIS OWN 
FRAUD ON THE GROUND OF PUBLIC 
POLICY. 
To let Lessor place in a lease that return of park-
ing rent shall bt the exclusive remedy no matter the 
5 
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damage caused by his fraud in the breach of the writ-
ten warranty is against public policy. 
P O I N T V I 
A COVENANT TO RETURN PARKING 
RENT WHICH IS NOT A REMEDY DOES 
NOT CALL ON A LESSEE TO CLAIM 
BREACH OF WARRANTY AT THE TIME OF 
RETURN OF RENT IN ORDER TO AVOID 
WAIVER OF THE BREACH OF WARRANTY. 
If return of parking rent is not a remedy then 
lessee has no duty to act on the breach warranty at the 
time he receives a return of parking rent. 
CONCLUSION 
A Lessor who agrees: 1, to pay parking rent and 
2. to return any rent on parking that is lost cannot make 
of his covenant to return parking rent an exclusive 
remedy for his breach of warranty that he does not know 
of any parking that will be lost. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H A T C H , McRAE & R I C H A R D S O N 
and ROD P . D I X O N 
By: Rod P . Dixon 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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